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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, A
Municipal Corporation,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
Case No.

JAMES PIEPENBURG,

14688

Defendant-Appellant.

ARGUMENT,
POINT

I

THE ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ON ITS FACE
Salt Lake City contends that its ordinance was
patterned verbatim from Oregon and Hawaii laws tacitly
approved by.the United States Supreme Court.
Brief, Pg. 6)

(Respondent's

To support this claim, in Exhibit "A" to its

brief, S:alt Lake juxtaposes Oregon and Hawaii definitions with
Salt Lake's definitions.

Salt Lake is correct.

virtually verbatim.

They are

.

But there the similarities end.

The charging

sections of the respective laws are so unalike that the
difference shines like a dead mackeral in the moonlight.

The

Oregon general obscenity law, Oregon Revised Statutes §167.087,
prohibits exhibiting "obscene" material.

See Oregon Revised
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Statutes §167.087 attached hereto as Appendix "A".

However/

the corresponding Salt Lake general obscenity law does not
prohibit exhibiting obscenity but prohibits exhibiting anything
which contains "obscene sexual conduct", an "obscene performance", "obscenities", etc.

See §32-2-10.

"Obscene

performance" is defined as one containing "nudity".
§32-2-10.1 (8) and "nudity" means bare breasts.
(7).

Thus a film of the Ballet

See

See §32-2-10.1

Africans or of National

Educational Television's Life Story of Isadora Duncan could
be proscribed because of bare breasts.

The artistic triumphs

of Sir Peter Paul Rubens and Amadeo Modigliani would presumptively be barred by the ordinance because of their
appreciation of the curve of the naked female form.

Time,

Newsweek, Vogue and National Geographic all have bare breasts
and thus become presumptively criminal materials.

Many of

the recent winners of the Pulitzer Prize and National Book
Award would be prosecutable by an overzealous Salt Lake
prosecutor on the grounds they contain obscenities.
If a film can be proscribed merely because it has
in it obscene sexual conduct, or an obscene performance, or
nudity or obscenities, the state can condemn it merely because
one part is objectionable.

This ignores the Supreme Court's

holding that the First Amendment requires that material be
treated as a whole, Miller v. Calif,, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-490 (1957)-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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While Oregon's statute is like Salt Lake's in
defining such terms as "obscenities", "obscene sexual conduct",
"nudity", etc., there is one monumental difference.
only proscribes such things for children.

Oregon

See Oregon Revised

Statutes §167.065, 167.075, 167.080 in Appendix "A" attached
hereto.

Salt Lake's draftsmen, however, prohibit such things

for adults and thus restrict adults to what may be suitable for
children.

Such is to "burn the house to roast the pig".

Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). ,
Admittedly Salt Lake's definition of "obscene"
is correct but where in its general obscenity law does Salt
Lake prohibit exhibition of "obscene" material?

Nowhere.

POINT II
THE ORDINANCE CANNOT BE SAVED BY
CONSTRUCTION OR SEVERANCE
Salt Lake relies heavily on the fact that several
trial judges have held part of the ordinance relating to
"obscene sexual conduct" constitutional and have severed the
rest.

(Respondent's Brief, Pg. 12). What those trial judges

ignore is that §32-2-10 (3) proscribes material that merely
depicts "obscene sexual conduct".

Thus if something merely

contains obscene sexual conduct it is criminal.
reach material that has one offensive
description

scene.

This would

See the

(pg. 9 of Appellant's Supplemental Brief) of

the German film "The Lost Honor of Katrina Blum", which has one
<
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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split-second depiction of "obscene sexual conduct" yet would
fall within the ordinance.

Such construction allows Salt Lake

to ignore the admonition in Miller and Roth that the material
must be judged as a whole.

413 U.S. at 24; 354 U.S. at 489-490.

To save this ordinance by construction, this court
must delete the following words from Salt Lake City Ordinance
§32-2-10 (3) :
" . . . depicts or represents or
describes obscene sexual conduct,
an obscene performance, obscenities
or obscene sado-masochistic abuse
with the intent to distribute the
same."

,

and replace them with the words:
"is obscene".
Such is not permissible construction.

A court may not delete

words from the middle of a statute or add words to it.
62 cases of Jam et. al. v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596
(1951).

See also 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §203 (courts cannot

add words to a statute).
Severance allows the court to strike part of a
statute only if the remaining part can stand on its own.
16 Am.Jur.2d Const. Law, §183.
Lake's ordinance.
statute remains.

This cannot be done with Salt

If §32-2-10 (3) is struck, no charging
If the objectionable part of it is struck,
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only part of a sentence remains.
The trial court blithely stated that it construed
the ordinance but it did not put down in 1-ack and white what
remained after striking part and did not look at it to determine whether that which remained made sense.

Had it done

so it would have realized the ordinance was butchered beyond
repair.
Salt Lake contends that the trial court gave
proper instructions and thus this conviction should stand.
However, whether proper instructions were given or not does
not bar a defendant such as PIEPENBURG, who admittedly may
be the subject of a properly drawn statute, from raising as
a complete defense, the fact that the statute on its face
may sweep within its ambit other protected activity.

The

First Amendment is so precious and the principle of eradicating all statutes which on their faces proscribe protected
activity so important, that it has come to be a doctrine of
First Amendment law that even though the defendant's activity
is not protected, he may raise overbreadth as a defense.
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-521 (1972).

NAACP v.

Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
The reason for this is obvious.

For example, if

the ordinance barred showing a film of a girl in a bathing
suit, can a theater be prosecuted under it so long as the

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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court instructs in the language of Miller?

Of course not.

POINT III
ASSUMING THE ORDINANCE CAN BE "AUTHORITATIVELY CONSTRUED" TO PASS CONSTITUTIONAL
MUSTER, THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE PREVENTS
PROSECUTING FOR ACTIVITY TRANSPIRING
BEFORE SUCH AUTHORITATIVE CONSTRUCTION
No one questions the right of an authoritative
construction to have retroactive civil effects but the due
process clause prevents criminal prosecution for activity
transpiring before the authoritative construction.

This is

so because before a man may be penalized criminally, he must
be able to ascertain in advance precisely what the law is
that governs his activity.

In Pierce v. United States,

314 U.S. 306 (1941) the court held:
M

. . . a . . . judicial enlargement
of a criminal Act by interpretation
is at war with a fundamental concept
of the common law that crimes must be
defined with appropriate definiteness."
(314 U.S. at 311)
In Crow v. State, 180 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.Crim.App. 1943) the
court held:
". . . when by judicial decision a
construction of a statute is changed
from that formerly given said statute
the change by the latter decision
should be given prospective effect
only." (180 S.W.2d at 356)

-6-
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See also United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 288 (1891)
(holding that before punishment can be imposed, one must be
able to precisely determine what the law is that governs
his activity.)
POINT IV
THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
FAILURE TO PROVIDE PROPER APPELLATE
REVIEW
Salt Lake ignores the well settled law that in
First Amendment

cases not only the statute but the entire

record must be reviewed by the appellate court.

The following

quote by the California Supreme Court from Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 31 Cal.Rptr. 800, 383 P.2d 152 (Sup.Ct.Cal. 1963)
clearly states appellant's position:
". . . the reviewing court must make
an 'independent examination1 of the
whole record in cases involving the
constitutional issue of free speech
(Edwards v. South Carolina (1963) ,
372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d
697; Niemotko v. Maryland (1951),
340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325, 95 L.Ed.
267; Feiner v. People of State of
New York (1951), 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct.
303, 95 L.Ed. 267; Pennekamp v. Florida'
(1946), 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029,
90 L.Ed. 1295; Fiske v. Kansas (1927),
274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655, 71 L.Ed.
1108; Attorney General v. Book Named
"Tropic of Cancer" (1962), 344 Mass.
, 184 N.E.2d 328; People v. Richmond County News (1961), 9 N.Y.2d 578,
580-581, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 175 N.E.2d
681 [opinion of Fuld, J.] . . . ."
(383 P.2d at 157)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus since this matter involves expression, this court must
review all issues or find the ordinance unconstitutional for
failure to provide proper appellate review on all issues.
See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 247 F.Supp.
906, 911 (N.D. Tex. 1965).
POINT V
THE JURY WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
TAINTED
Salt Lake cites law to the effect that PIEPENBURG
must prove prejudice from the tainted jury.

Such cases do

not apply here because the fact situation before this court is
so completely different from those in the cases cited by
Salt Lake.

In the typical case, the alleged tainted jury

has read newspaper articles about the case or has made an
unauthorized phone call or a juror inadvertently does something questionable.

Such fact situations give rise to the

.

cases cited by Salt Lake.
This case is a horse of a different color.

It

came to trial in the midst of an anti-obscenity campaign by
the church, with statements from its president that each
should "do all in their power" to fight obscenity, that members
should "become actively and relentlessly engaged in the fight
against pornography."

See Exhibit "2 D".

Against this backdrop, then Deputy Attorney General

- s -

••
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Hansen investigated jurors by going to their bishops and
church leaders for information about them (T-18).

This becomes

known to the jurors and so they are aware that their church,
their spiritual and moral leaders, are cooperating with and
are on the side of the prosecutor.
At this point, the court suggests that statements
to the media by the prosecutor might pose a problem (T-19).
In apparent compliance with this suggestion, the prosecutors
advise the court that they will ask the media not to print
previous statements they made to them (T-19).

Then, with the

nerve of a riverboat gambler, at the very next recess, after
giving his word to the court, Hansen states to the media
that he checked whether jurors were "pro or anti-pornography";
that he checked jurors through their bishops, that five
jurors favored conviction and two would probably hold out
for a hung jury.

(T-142, et. seq., Exhibit "13 D") . Five

jurors saw this interview on television.
Apart from the effect of Hansen's television
interview

in the midst of the trial, jurors learned what

was being done about them from other sources.

One juror was

told by a church official he was being checked out (T-162).
Another was aware a check was made as to whether she was a
good girl or "partied a lot" (T-161).
Thus these subtle pressures conspired together
inexorably to compel the jurors to prove, by their verdict,
that they were good church members, that they were not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"party girls", that they were not pro-pornography,

A threat

of violence to the jurors could not have been more effective.
They felt themselves on trial.

Their good names were at

stake.
In response to all this, Salt Lake argues that
the trial judge's decision on this be followed.
there, he should know.

He was

(Respondent's Brief, Pg. 42). The

judge was there all right and at various times he stated,
"the court didn't satisfy itself", that the jurors were
unaffected (T-167).

He was "extremely concerned" about the

Attorney General's activity, and that he did not know "what
the effect of the stories may have been"

(T-158,165).

He

found that there was "subtle persuasion"; that the jurors
know that they are "being watched" (T-252).

The following

colloquy graphically demonstrates the trial judge's opinion
after hearing testimony regarding the tactics of the Deputy
Attorney General:
The prosecutor:
". . . There's no showing . . .
that the jury is tainted to the
point where they can't render a
fair and impartial judgment . . . "
The court:
"The problem the court has in
connection with it, it isn't
'tained to a point', its tainted"
(T-251). (Emphasis supplied)
Later the trial judge apparently forgot that
earlier he had unequivocally found the jury tainted. While
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the ruling of the trial judge on the Motion for Mistrial is
on Salt Lake's sidef his findings are mint for reversal.
Appellant's counsel respectfully suggests that perhaps the
trial judge's personal feelings were at war with his legal
instincts.

He sentenced PIEPENBURG, a father of infant

children, to jail to the maximum jail term in a case where
the crime is only a misdemeanor, where it was the defendant's
first offense and by the trial court's own finding, the jury
was tainted and where his alleged crime consisted of showing
a film that a responsible court had held to be not obscene
as a matter of law.

Somewhat unusual in the state where most

first offenders in nonviolent felony cases get probation when
convicted by juries who no one claims are tainted, where no
court had previously ruled that the alleged misconduct was
noncriminal as a matter of law.
To all this, Salt Lake replies that the jurors
said they would be unaffected by being investigated and
"watched".

Courts should be chary to accept a juror's own

protestations of his ability to be fair but should decide the
issue for themselves from all the facts.
treat themselves.

Doctors do not

Lawyers should not represent themselves

and by definition, one who is partial is not impartial to
judge his own lack of partiality.
of such subtle moral forces?

Who can judge the effect

What good woman would not agonize

over and pay any price to avoid being known as a "party
girl?"

How many women would choose the scarlet letter?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Can

all the jurors do it?
lives for.

Such is the stuff men have given their

Yet Salt Lake tells us that these considerations

are trivial.
POINT VI
THE NORTH CAROLINA DECISION FINDING
MEMORIES NOT OBSCENE AS A MATTER OF
LAW REMOVES THE NECESSARY ELEMENT OF
INTENT FROM THE CRIME
Salt Lake asks this court to disregard State ex
rel. Yeager v. Neal, 26 N.C.App. 741, 217 S.E.2d 576 (1975)
because community standards vary from state to state.
(Respondent's Brief, Pg. 49). Of course, community standards
vary from state to state and had Neal been decided on the
issue of community standards, PIEPENBURG would have no argument.

The film, however, was held not obscene as a matter of

law because it did not lack serious artistic value.
Appendix A to Appellant's Supplemental Brief).
affirmed on appeal.

(See

This was

The artistic value test is totally

independent of community standards, is not modified by
community standards and does not vary from community to
community.

Miller v. Calif., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
Salt Lake also claims that if one court's finding

of nonobscenity can be used favorably by a defendant in
another court, then a finding of obscenity in one court
against one defendant could be used against another defendant

• -12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in another court without benefit of trial. Without getting
into the myriad complexities of this tortured analogy suffice
it to say that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right
to Confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and that the Bill
of Rights does not extend to prosecutorial bodies.

Intro-

duction of a finding of obscenity in a case where the defendant did not appear denies him this constitutional right.
POINT VII
THE SURVEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED
Salt Lake contends that before a survey can be
probative, all interviewees must be shown the film in question.
(Appellee's Brief, Pgs. 32 and 33).

This ignores the fact

that Salt Lake contends that showing the film is a crime.
If Salt Lake is right, a defendant must commit a crime to
present a defense in court; in fact, to do a good survey,
he must commit the crime 500 times.

Under Salt Lake's theory,

in order to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to adduce
evidence in his behalf, he must risk additional prosecution.
It is well established that no price must be paid for exercising
one's constitutional right.

Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.

593, 597 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
394 (1968).
In Miller v. Calif., 413 U.S. 15, 31 (Footnote 12)
(1973), the Supreme Court upheld the use of surveys in
obscenity cases.

In that case, the foundation for the poll
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was much weaker than here.

In this case, an experienced

survey analyst using scientfically accepted methods of surve;
analysis, was employed.

In Miller, a police officer merely

went out and asked questions.

Certainly the defendant's

survey here comports more with reliability than that which
the Supreme Court sanctioned.
Surveys are generally admitted if they are
relevant on any issue in the case.

Holiday Inns, Inc. v.

Holiday Out In America, 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1973);
Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216
F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).

But obscenity is the one and

only area of the law where surveys are a must because
community standards is the test.

The jurors are forbidden tc

use their own standards. Stiith v. Calif., 361 U.S. 147, 165166 (1959) (Frankfurter concurring).

In re Gianinni, 72

Cal. Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535, 544 (1968).
prove community standards?
A document?

How else do you

With a photograph?

An eye witnes

That is why the Supreme Court in Miller was so

lenient in letting in such a palpably weak survey—there is r
other way.
Surveys asking the same questions as the defense
survey are admitted in obscenity cases. See Pines.

The

Obscentiy Quagmire, California State Bar Journal, 509, 561
(Nov./Dec. 1974)
Salt Lake contends that if the survey were probati

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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unanimous verdicts such as against PIEPENBURG would be unlikely.
(Appellee's Brief, Pg. 32). This, the City contends, bespeaks
the inherent lack of reliability and probative value of the
survey.

This reasoning tortures truth.

The public record

discloses that before this case came to trial, PIEPENBRUG was
acquitted in Salt Lake City
Salt Lake City

Case No. 37450; acquitted in

Case No. 38086; that in Salt Lake City, Case

No. 43919, the City dismissed its case and that there was
also a hung jury in Case No. 37450.

The case before this Court

is the only conviction ever sustained against him.

Thus,

contrary to Salt Lake's claim, the results tend to support
the survey.
Salt Lake claims that the poll is too remote in
time and, therefore, not probative.
by one and one-half years.

It claims it is remote

(Respondent's Brief, Pg. 31).

Salt Lake is wrong; it was not one and one-half years, it was
approximately nine and one-half months.
activity was October 24, 1975.
1975.

The alleged criminal

The poll was taken February 1,

Did the sex mores of Salt Lake undergo a radical change

in nine and one-half months?
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APPENDIX A
ORSCENITY AND RELATED OFFENSES

167.060 Definitions for ORS 167.060 to 167.095.
As used in ORS 167.060 to 167.095, unless the context
requires otherwise:
(1)

"Advertising purposes" means purposes of

propagandizing in connection with the commercial sale of
a product or type of product, the commercial offering of a
service, or the commercial exhibition of an entertainment.
(2)

"Displays publicly" means the exposing,

placing, posting, exhibiting, or in any fashion displaying
in any location, whether public or private, an item in such a
manner that it may be readily seen and its content or character
distinguished by normal unaided vision viewing it from a public
thoroughfare, depot or vehicle.
(3)

"Furnishes" means to sell, give, rent, loan

or otherwise provide.
(4)

"Minor" means an unmarried person under 18

years of age.
(5)

"Nudity" means uncovered, or less than

opaquely covered, post-pubertal human genitals, pubic areas,
the post-pubertal human female breat below a point immediately
above the top of the areola, or the covered human male genitals

app. i.
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in a discernibly turgid state.

For purposes of this definition,

a female breast is considered uncovered if the nipple only or
the nipple and aerola only are covered.
(6)

"Obscene performance" means a play, motion

picture, dance, show or other presentation, whether pictured,
animated or live, performed before an audience and which in
whole or in part depicts or reveals nudity, sexual conduct,
sexual excitement or sadomasochistic abuse, or which includes
obscenities or explicit verbal discriptions or narrative
accounts of sexual conduct.
(7)

"Obscenities" means those slang words currently

generally rejected for regular use in mixed society, that are
used to refer to genitals, female breasts, sexual conduct or
excretory functions or products, either that have no other
meaning or that in context are clearly used for their bodily,
sexual or excretory meaning.
(8)

"Public thoroughfare, depot or vehicle" means

any street, highway, park, depot or transportation platform,
or other place, whether indoors or out, or any vehicle for
public transportation, owned or operated by government, either
directly or through a public corporation or authority, or
owned or operated by any agency of public transportation that
is designed for the use, enjoyment or transportation of the
general public.
(9)

"Sadomasochistic abuse" means flagellation or
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torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume, or the condition
of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on
the part of one so clothed.
(10)

"Sexual conduct" means human masturbation,

sexual intercourse, or any touching of the genitals, pubic
areas or buttocks of the human male or female, or the breasts
of the female, whether alone or between members of the same or
opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of
apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.
(11)

"Sexual excitement" means the condition of

human male or female genitals or the breats of the female
when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or
nudity.
[1971 c.743 s.255]
. 167.065

Furnishing obscene materials to minors.

(1) A person commits the crime of furnishing obscene materials
to minors if, knowing or having good reason to know the
character of the material furnished, he furnishes to a minor:
(a) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture,
motion picture, film or other visual representation or image
of a person or portion of the human body that depicts nudity,
sadomasochistic abuse, sexual conduct or sexual excitement; or
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(b)

Any book, magazine, paperback, pamphlet or

other written or printed matter, however reproduced, or any
sound recording which contains matter of the nature described
in paragraph (a) of this subsection, or obscenities, or explicit
verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual conduct,
sexual excitement or sadomasochistic abuse.
(2)

Furnishing obscene materials to minors is

a Class A misdemeanor.

Notwithstanding ORS 161.635 and 161.655,

a person convicted under this section may be sentenced to pay
a fine, fixed by the court, not exceeding $10,000.
[1971 c.743 s.256]
167.075 Exhibitin an obscene performance to a
minor.

(1)

A person commits

the crime of exhibiting an

obscene performance to a minor if the minor is unaccompanied
by his parent or lawful guardian, and for a monetary consideration or other valuable commodity or service, the person
knowingly or recklessly:
(a)

Exhibits an obscene performance to the minor;

(b)

Sells an admission ticket or other means to

or

gain entrance to an obscene performance to the minor; or
(c)

Permits the admission of the minor to

premises whereon there is exhibited an obscene performance.
(2)

No employee is liable to prosecution under

this seciton or under any city or home-rule county ordinance
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for exhibiting or possessing with intent to exhibit any
obscene motion picture provided the employee is acting
within the scope of his regular employment at a showing
open to the public.
(3)

As used in this section, "employee" means any

person regularly employed by the owner or operator of a
motion picture theater if he has no financial interest other
than salary or wages in the ownership or operation of the
motion picture theater, no financial interest in or control
over the selection of the motion pictures shown in the theater,
and is working within the motion picture theater where he is
regularly employed, but does not include a manager of the
motion picture theater.
(4)

Exhibiting an obscene performance to a minor

is a Class A misdemeanor.

Notwithstanding ORS 161.635 and

161.655, a person convicted under this section may be sentenced to pay a fine, fixed by the court, not exceeding
$10,000.
[1971 c.743 s.258]
167.080
(1)

Displaying obscene materials to minors.

A person commits the crime of displaying obscene materials

to minors if, being the owner, operator or manager of a business or acting in a managerial capacity, he knowingly or
recklessly permits a minor who is not accompanied by his
parent or lawful guardian to enter or remain on the premises,
if in that part of the premises where the minor is so permitted
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to be, there is visibly displayed:
(a)

Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture,

or other visual representation or image of a person or portion
of the human body that depicts nudity, sexual conduct, sexual
excitement or sadomasochistic abuse; or
(b)

Any book, magazine, paperback, pamphlet

or other written or printed matter, however reproduced, that
reveals a person or portion of the human body that depicts
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement or sadomasochistic
abuse.

/ .
(2)

Displaying obscene materials to minors is

a Class A misdemeanor.

Notwithstanding ORS 161.635 and

161.655, a person convicted under this section may be sentenced to pay a fine, fixed by the court, not exceeding $10,000.
[1971 c.743 s.259]
167.087

Disseminating obscene material.

(1)

A

person commits the crime of disseminating obscene material
if he knowingly makes, exhibits, sells, delivers or provides,
or offers or agrees to make, exhibit, sell, deliver or provide,
or has in his possession with intent to exhibit, sell,
deliver or provide any obscene writing, picture, motion
picture, films, slides, drawings or other visual reproduction.
(2)

As used in subsection (1) of this section,

matter is obscene if:
(a)

It depicts or describes in a patently offen-

sive manner sadomasochistic abuse or sexual conduct;
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(b)

The average person applying contemporary

state standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest in sex; and
(c)

Taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary,

artistic, political or scientific value.
(3)

In any prosecution for a violation of this

section, it shall be relevant on the issue of knowledge to
prove the advertising, publicity, promotion, method of
handling or labeling of the matter, including any statement
on the cover or back of any book or magazine,
(4)

No employee is liable to prosecution under

this section or under any city or home-rule county ordinance
for exhibiting or possessing with intent to exhibit any
obscene motion picture provided the employee is acting within
the scope of his regular employment at a showing open to the
public.
(5)

As used in this section, "employee" means

an employee as defined in subsection (3) of ORS 167.075.
(6)

Disseminating obscene material is a Class A

misdemeanor.
[1973 c.699 s.4]
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